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Abstract 
 
This dissertation was written as part of the MSc in International Accounting, Auditing 
and Financial Management at the International Hellenic University.  
 
The purpose of this thesis is to investigate the association between earnings 
management and the impact of gender diversity. More specifically, it refers to the role 
of female directors in audit committees and how their presence affects earnings 
management.  
 
The issue of female representation in Board of Directors and Audit Committees 
compiles a significant issue for all the countries as well as for the countries members of 
EU. In the following text there are various different research papers about audit 
committees’ characteristics and their effects on earnings quality. In order to examine 
earnings quality discretionary accruals were used. Based on prior literature, 
hypotheses as support are formulated. After examining a sample of 349 firms from 17 
European countries for 2016, we do not find satisfying indication that there is a relation 
betwixt gender diversity and accrual- based earnings management.  Although most of 
the previous literature reports different findings, Sun et al. (2011) also did not manage 
to find any association between those two variables although they tried to make more 
sensitivity tests as we will also present after our main results. the highest percentage of 
relevant previous studies were aimed attention to US firms and other audit committee 
characteristics and after the application of mandatory and voluntary quotas about 
female representation, there is not much research, consequently this study may 
provide some evidence as for their influence in European companies.  
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1. Introduction 
The main objective of this research is to inspect the relationship betwixt some audit 
committees characteristics and their effects on financial reporting quality. More 
specifically, I will pay particular attention to the role of women in audit committees and 
their effects on earnings management. Also, we will examine two more variables which 
are audit committee’s female independence and audit committee size as both of the 
may present an important impact on earnings management. The concept of mandatory 
audit committees started from listed companies in NYSE in 1939, while in Europe it 
was the Statutory Audit Directive that published by the European Commission in 2006 
and set up audit committees to become a key feature of the corporate governance 
framework for all EU Member States.  
 
Generally, EU used the approach of corporate governance for enhancing the efficiency 
and the completeness of firms and to rebuild European investors’ confidence. The term 
of corporate governance is meant as a compilation of rules and principles related with 
the management of corporate businesses.  Audit committee is considered as a main 
part of the corporate governance mechanism and it is involved in firm’s external and 
internal audit, accounting and financial reporting, regulatory compliance, risk 
management and in organization’s internal control. The monitoring function of the audit 
committee was further accentuated after many investors lost their confidence in 
managers and external audits after Enron case. In Europe there were similar financial 
fraud cases like Lernout & Hauspie in 2000 and Swissair in 2001.  
 
While the Statutory Audit Directive in 2006 and of corporate governance standards and 
best practices across Europe required the existence of an audit committee in each 
Public Interest Entity, there are still some differences between countries regarding the 
composition and functioning of the audit committee. These differences come from the 
fact that corporate governance is organized differently in each European country, for 
instance the one-tier or two-tier boards structure, and as a result this affects the audit 
committee functioning. 
 
As the role of the audit committee has expanded throughout the years its composition 
has also been discussed and except from financial experts as members it has also 
discussed the issue of gender equality. Generally, the European Commission has 
started from 2016 the “Strategic engagement for gender equality 2016-2019”. 
Furthermore, in 2012, the Commission proposed a mandatory quota of 40% female 
representation on Boards of Directors in European listed firms. 
 
In 2016 the organization European Women on Boards made an investigation for the 
period 2011-2015 in 600 largest European listed companies which are included in 
STOXX 600 Index. On the one hand, they found that most companies have increased 
female directors in Boards as well as in committees the last years because of the 
enforcement of mandatory quotas. Nevertheless, throughout the years there are more 
actions concerning the increase of women especially in leadership positions. It is also 
interesting to mention that the appointments for women to board and committee chair 
positions tend to move slowly, as women now accounting for 4 percent of board chairs 
while 16 percent for audit committees. Out of the 12 largest European markets, five 
have mandatory quotas on female board membership. These countries are Belgium, 
France, Germany, Italy and Norway. The rest countries have optional quotas for best 
practice recommendations about board gender diversity.  
 
The research of Sun, Liu and Lan (2011) indicates that female executives in audit 
committees are probably more ethical than male executives. Moreover, Bruns and 
Merchand (1990) declare that earnings manipulation is an ethical issue and as a result 
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women presence in audit committees may reduce the motivation for earnings 
manipulation. As supported by gender theory as well as on relevant literature which will 
be described in literature review female directors may influence decision- making in 
audit committees. Furthermore, for supporting the impact of female directors in audit 
committees in European firms, the following research question is formulated: 
 
“Does the presence of women in audit committee effects earnings management?” 
 
This study is relevant, because most of the existing literature focuses on other audit 
committee characteristics like independence, frequency of meetings, size and on 
expertise of its members rather than their gender. According to the research of Adams 
and Funk (2012) female directors are more benevolent but less power oriented. This 
makes this investigation more interesting as the choice to apply earnings management 
may be connected with power relations on Boards as well as in audit committees. 
 
Discretionary accruals amounts as a proxy for earnings management and it’s a method 
for evaluating earnings quality as that reflects to accruals that are due to 
management’s choices and there may be no business reason to exist. According to 
Papanastasopoulos and Tsiritakis (2015) accruals are negatively associated with future 
earnings performance basically due to accounting distortions related with their higher 
subjectivity. These distortions may occur from estimation errors in accruing future 
benefits and obligations as well as from the opportunistic use of accruals by managers 
in order to manipulate information included in financial statements and mislead their 
interested parties who read them. 
 
The results of the empirical analysis indicate that there is no evidence that gender 
diversity in the audit committee may impact the level of earnings management. Our 
results are not in accord with most of prior literature, except from the research of Sun et 
al (2011) which also argues that there is no relation betwixt female directors and 
earnings management. However, our findings must be cautiously interpreted as there 
are some limitations which may affect our final results. As for the other two hypothesis 
analyzed, we find a significant negative association between the presence of female 
independent directors and earnings quality.  
 
This research contributes to the existing literature on earnings management by 
providing evidence on the relationship between the presence of women in audit 
committees and earnings quality on European firms. Although there are important 
changes in European firms with the mandatory quotas of female representation on 
boards and committees there are studies about the percentages of increase and not so 
many about their effects. Also, to our knowledge, prior studies referred mainly on 
earnings management on US firms and we have less information as for the impact of 
female members on audit committees to earnings quality. More specifically, this 
research is focused on 349 clusters of firms from 17 European Countries included in 
the 600 STOXX Index and their accounts were examined for 2016. 
 
The structure of this thesis is as follows. Chapter 2 includes the literature review and 
the hypothesis development. Firstly is presented the relative literature about earnings 
management and female representation on audit committees and then the hypothesis 
are discussed. Within the third chapter are contained our sample selection as well as 
the methodology followed to reach our results. Chapter four highlights the results. It 
starts with the descriptive statistics and the tests of the regression assumptions, it 
continues with our main results from our empirical analysis and it ends with our 
sensitivity and robustness tests. Finally, on our last chapter 5 we summarize the 
conclusion and the limitations of this research and at the same time topics for future 
research are proposed. 
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2. Theoretical Review   
 
2.1 Earnings Management 
A common definition for the term earnings management was given is: “Earnings 
management occurs when managers use judgment in financial reporting and in 
structuring transactions to alter financial reports to either mislead some stakeholders 
about the underlying economic performance of the firm or to influence contractual 
outcomes that depend on reported accounting numbers” (Healy & Wahlen, 1999). 
Compatible to related literature I will examine earnings quality with the use of 
discretionary accruals. Generally, managers use both accrual- based and real activity 
earnings management for manipulating the reported earnings. (Dechow and Skinner, 
2000; Healy and Wahlen, 1999; Zang, 2006). 
 
Gunny (2010), refers that firms using accrual- based earnings management are making 
choices according to generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) that try to 
obscure or cover their actual economic performance. On the other hand, real 
management occurs when managers undertake decisions and actions that change the 
timing and structuring of multiple financial transactions. The basic difference between 
accrual based and real earnings management is the time they occur. The first usually 
happens at the end of the fiscal year while the other one occurs throughout the year 
(Zang, 2012).   
 
Graham et al. (2005), surveyed and took interviews from 400 executives in order to 
precise the factors that drive to reported earnings and disclosure decisions. They found 
that managers would rather take economic actions that could not only affect the current 
period cash flows but also impact the future profitability of the firm than make within 
GAAP. More specifically, they mention that 80% of the executives interviewed concede 
that they would decrease discretionary spending on R&D, advertising and maintenance 
to meet earnings targets. The research of Roychowdhury (2006) also indicates similar 
various reasons why managers choose real activities earnings management. Although 
by choosing real earnings manipulation the long- term costs of the company are 
increasing, managers tend to use this method basically due to the lower private costs 
they suffer in contrast with the accrual manipulation.  
 
There is also evidence that firms engaged in real manipulation (Cohen & Zarowin, 
2010; Roychowdhury, 2006; Zang, 2011) may present greater effects than accruals 
earnings management as this method alters firms’ behavior and not just their 
accounting methods (Swai et al. 2016). Furthermore, accrual- based earnings 
manipulation is more prone to scrutiny and as a result it can be easily get perceived by 
auditors and regulators.  
 
Finally, Zang (2012) mentions that costs related to earnings management are those 
who play the decisive role in choosing the appropriate technique of earnings 
management. The method bears the lowest costs is the one that used by the 
managers.  
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2.1.2 Audit committee and earnings management 
There are various prior studies that examine the association between audit committees’ 
characteristics and earnings management.  Firstly, audit committees are designed to 
supervise, monitor and advice  the management of an organization in implementing 
internal accounting control systems and enhancing the credibility of audited financial 
statements (Arun, Almahrog, & Aribi, 2015; Bédard & Gendron, 2010; Sun, Liu, & Lan, 
2011). 
 
According to Klein 2002 one of its basic role as overseer of the company’s financial 
reporting process is to face the collision occurs between managers and external 
auditors by their meetings on a regular basis. The audit committee has a decisive role 
in decreasing the risk of material errors in financial statements and therefore, it 
enhances the quality as well as the credibility of the financial information. This is 
succeeding as the audit committee is liable for the flow of information among the 
company’s management, external and internal auditors and the Board of Directors. 
 
 In order to understand better the effectiveness of audit committees the term of agency 
theory will be used. It is referred to problems in the relationship between principals and 
agents in business. The most known agency relationship in industry is between 
shareholders and management and because there are core problems between them, 
such as conflict of interest, this leads to the increase of agency costs. According to 
agency theory, if shareholders increase their monitoring costs, which lead to decrease 
of agent cost, this will lead to better observe agent’s actions as well as prevent them 
from make decisions which may reduce firm’s value. Within monitoring costs is 
included the audit committee which act as an effective channel to solve these 
problems.  
 
Authors which made researches more than 10 years ago supported that female 
directors are more ethically minded and it is more likely  to identify dishonest behaviors 
than men (e.g. Ruegger and King, 1992; Martinez, 2016). Similar results are also found 
in more recent researches as for example Ittonen et al. (2010) and Clatworthy (2013) 
who argue that female directors have a positive influence on the accuracy of financial 
statements as their participation decrease the probability of financial information with 
errors.  
 
Moreover, according to agency theory mentioned above there are differences between 
managers and shareholder’s desires and goals. In order this conflict to be reduced, 
shareholders provide incentive plans like linking accounting earnings with managers’ 
compensations. However, it is known that managers could be motivated to manipulate 
accounting earnings through discretionary accruals. That phenomenon exists because 
accounting earnings are deemed a common measure in evaluating company’s 
performance and managers may spurred in using those practices for misguiding the 
financial statement users as for company’s economic performance. That happens 
because in many companies managers are compensated directly through salaries and 
bonus or indirectly through future promotion or improvement of their professional image 
which both are depending on firm’s earnings performance. According to Xie et al 
(2003), the combination of management’s discretion over reporting earnings and their 
effect on their compensation may lead to a potential agency problem. There are 
various similar theories, such as stewardship and stakeholder theory, which are 
extensions of agency theory but in summary all of them support different ways in order 
to reduce the problems occur by the conflict of interest between company’s managers 
and shareholders.  
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Agency problems or agency costs may also occur when earnings manipulation conceal 
real performance from investors who want to buy, sell or hold securities. Furthermore, 
in highly levered buyouts, managers overstate earnings to get favorable debt contract 
terms (Fisher and Louis, 2008). Other studies provide evidence that earnings 
management is used to affect capital market participants. For instance, Rangan(1998) 
and Dechow et al. (1996) argue that managers inflate earnings before the seasoned 
equity offerings. On the other hand, Teoh et al (1998) supports that manipulating 
earnings prior to initial public equity offerings will lead to poor stock return performance 
in the next 3 years.   
 
Another popular theory is stewardship theory which in contrast with agency theory 
which is based in economics, its theoretical basis comes from organizational 
psychology and sociology. Their basic difference is the approach of motivation. On 
agency theory, “agent” motivators are solely financial while in stewardship there is no 
need to implement “costly” motivators. The so- called “satisfactory remuneration” is 
enough (Glinkowska, 2005). According to Wasserman (2006), managers and stewards 
have common interests with shareholders and the firm, too. As for the audit 
committee’s role it is supported that it has to enhance and accommodate management 
instead of authorize and audit it. It is also argued that managers are not encouraged to 
practice earnings management. That’s because managers act in accordance with 
shareholders’ interests and they are motivated by the successful performance and the 
desire for achievement and recognition, rather than financial incentives. This theory 
can be linked with gender diversity as women on audit committees may affect financial 
reporting quality. Female directors may be involved more in management and act as 
stewards in the company in order to protect company’s interests.  
 
As mentioned above, there is the stakeholder theory as an extension of agency theory 
which is linked indirectly with audit committee’s function. This theory supports that a 
firm should create value for its shareholders as well as for its stakeholders (Freeman, 
1984). Stakeholders control resources which are crucial for the function of firm and as 
a result managers in order to continue the success of the company have to devote their 
attention to the needs and long- term interests of stakeholders (Gras-Gil et al., 2016). 
According to Hillman et al. (2001) board gender diversity contributes to comprehend 
and treat stakeholder relations. Women is possible to help to develop more responsible 
policies in order to avoid earnings manipulation which reinforce the validity of financial 
reports and protects the stakeholders’ interests. Finally, as audit committee is part of 
company’s corporate governance women in audit committees may also influence 
earnings management as they concern about the requirements of all stakeholders.  
 
 
2.1.3 Gender Theory 
Gender diversity is defined as the fair presentation of men and women in the 
workplace. Gender diversity attributes to a strong firm’s financial performance. Varied 
perspectives and different leadership styles provide greater options with broader 
implication and intense adaptability in a continuously evolving market. More than 75% 
of CEO’s priorities are the gender equality, but, women are still undervalued and 
underrepresented. The main reason for this phenomenon is the global gender gap that 
leaves women far from leadership positions. 
 
Psychology and sociology studies have dealt with differences exists between the 
sexes, such as in cognitive functioning, in communicational skills, decision- making and 
leadership styles. Given these differences, they are connected with management and 
according to related corporate finance literature; gender diversity may have important 
implications for corporate governance. Wood et al. (1985) argues that women show off 
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more advanced communicational skills and they present more effective results in their 
performance in comparison with men on group problem-solving and decision- making 
issues that require discussion and consensus. Halpern (2000) and Burgess (2002) 
indicate similar results that not only groups which include both women and men 
performed more effectively but also by expanding female participation may reduce 
corporate failure. Furthermore, more recent study from Nielsen and Huse (2010) shows 
that the conflicts that are created among board members may be faced by female 
participation ob boards and committee, as they urge using best practice within the firm. 
 
According to Steward and Munro (2007) female directors except from better 
communication abilities they present better meeting preparation. In the same vein, 
Huse and Solberg (2006) found that female directors when joining board meetings are 
better prepared than men and as a result female representation is likely to enhance 
corporate board behavior as well as its functioning and effectiveness. Moreover, as 
noted by Fondas and Sassalos (2000) female directors show more responsible 
behaviours when performing their duties within committees and boards and they make 
a great effort to bring them to the end correctly. It is also supported that female 
directors by having more targeted conversations, more advanced communicational 
ability, better open- minded view and by raising the presence of board and committee 
members on meetings they may succeed to control managers and CEOs for suspicious 
movements and this may lead the firm to improve its earnings quality (Adams and 
Ferreira, 2006; Martinez et al. 2016; Srininhi et al. 2011). 
 
Prior literature in psychology, sociology and management reports that women are more 
conservative and risk averse than men (Byrnes et al., 1999). Throughout the years it 
has been confirmed by various authors that women present a more ethical view than 
men and it seems to be more capable in identifying unethical behaviors (Ruegger and 
King, 1992; Eweje and Brunton, 2010). In the same view, other studies show that 
female directors are more risk averse in decision making and conservative than men 
(Byrnes et al., 1999; Man and Wong, 2013; Eckel and Grossman, 2008). Both of them, 
risk aversion and conservatism, may influence the integrity of the financial reporting 
process. As supported by Hemingway (2007), earnings management is associated with 
risk and as mentioned above women present more conservative behaviors than men 
which may lead to the conclusion that it is more possible for men to manipulate 
financial statements than women. Krishman and Parsons (2008) investigated Fortune 
500 companies  from 1996-2000 as for the the association between earnings quality 
and the presence of women in managerial positions found that earnings management 
is lower and earnings quality is higher when there is at least one female director on the 
audit committee.  
 
Grosvold et al. (2007) supports that by increasing female representation it greatly 
benefits all the ‘companies, stockholders and customers. The presence of women in 
audit committees may improve firm’s reporting discipline and increase investor 
confidence in financial statement as they could impact positively on the accuracy of 
financial information (Siridhi et al. ,2011; Clatworthy and Peel, 2013). Gul et al. (2007) 
indicates that women do not only exhibit greater risk aversion and ethical behavior but 
they are also better at obtaining voluntary information which may lead to decrease of 
information asymmetry between female directors and managers.  
 
In summary, these studies presented above provide evidence to support that gender 
differences affect conservatism, decision- making, and risk preference of the 
management within the company. Based on these prior studies we hypothesize that 
the presence of women in audit committees reinforces the external governance of the 
firm and may lead to reduced earnings management.  
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2.1.4 Women on Boards of Directors and Committees in Europe 
In the EU men acquire higher percentages in leadership positions in comparison with 
women but within the last years the promotion of gender equality is considered as one 
of the core policy goal for many European counties. In 2012, the European 
Commission suggested a Directive that would install a mandatory quota of 40% 
obligatory female representation on Boards of Directors in European listed companies 
by 2020. The Commission in order to support those argues that gender equality in a 
board and its committees would positive influence company’s corporate governance 
and performance- the more gender varied the board is, the better its performance. In 
April 2016, according to the Report on equality between women and men, the average 
representation of women on Boards was 23,3% in the publicly listed companies 
registered in EU-28. In France, Sweden, Italy, Finland, Germany, Netherlands, Latvia, 
UK, Belgium and Denmark the female representation reaches at least a quarter of the 
board.  
 
The table below1 illustrates the countries which exceed the average of 23,3% and 
although some countries are far from the gender balance zone there is a significant 
increase throughout the years. Within European Union the countries above the average 
were: Belgium (26,6%), Denmark (27%), Finland (29,9%), France (37,1%), Germany 
(27,2%), Italy (30%), Latvia (27,7%), the Netherlands (28,1%), Slovenia (23,9%), 
Sweden (36,1%), United Kingdom (27,1%).   
 
 
 
There are various examples of gender diversity promotion from governments either as 
proposed or as mandatory quotas. For example, Sweden has warned that if companies 
were not willing to voluntary reserve 25% of board seats to women, then Sweden 
would establish gender equality as a legal requirement. Another significant instance 
concerns Norway, where in 2008 it was decided that all listed companies should 
adhere to 40% gender share for the presence of female directors. The same law was 
also decided by Spain in order to raise the quota of female directors. In the appendix it 
is presented the table with the countries of EU and the shares of women on boards and 
which of these countries have taken legislative actions or other measures which lead to 
the increase of women on the boards. 
 
 
 
                                               
1 Data: April, 2016. Source: http://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/document.cfm?doc_id=46280 
 [- 12 -] 
 
2.1.5 Relevant empirical findings and hypothesis development 
According to the literature mentioned above, we observe that the issue of female 
participation in Board of Directors and Audit Committees compiles a significant issue 
for all the countries as well as for the countries members of EU.  
 
Previous studies suggest that earnings management may be affected by audit 
committee size although it has also been presented and some different results. On the 
one hand, Marra et al. (2011) using a sample of companies listed in Milan Stock 
Exchange from 2003 to 2006 found that smaller boards are more effective in 
monitoring than larger boards. This is in line with Jensen (1993) who supports that 
large boards may be ineffective because of higher communication costs and he 
suggests that a large audit committee may face the same problems. On the other hand, 
Bushman (2004) argues that larger audit committee boards are less likely to be 
influenced by managers. This view is also supported by Beasley et Salterio (2001) as 
they support that bigger audit committees are more probable to moderate earnings 
management as within audit committees are included members with different views 
and more specialized knowledge. Finally, there is another view from Klein (2002) who 
argues that “one size can’t fit all”. Therefore, the first hypothesis is formulated: 
 
H1: A negative relationship is expected between the size of the audit committee and 
accrual-based earnings management. 
 
In most European countries it is recommended that the audit committee is composed 
mainly of independent directors. Klein (2002) indicates that greater shares of 
independent directorswithin audit committee leads to reduced levels of earnings 
manipulation, which may lead to the conjunction, that external audit committee 
directors serve an important role in monitoring the firm’s financial reporting process and 
constraining earnings management. Srinidhi (2011) shows that firms with female non-
executive directors, especially on audit committees present better financial reporting 
quality.  Moreover, Niskanen et al. (2011) who made a research in almost 100000 
Finnish firms for the period 1999-2006, indicate that female auditors are more 
conservative than male as also supported from previous literature and that also 
improves financial quality. If we take into account that auditors are independent we 
may hypothesize that if female directors are outside the company there will be 
presented similar results. Thus it is expected a negative association between 
independent female members in audit committees and earnings management resulting 
in the following hypothesis: 
 
H2: A negative association is predicted between the presence of independent female 
directors in audit committees and earnings management. 
 
Another characteristic that mentioned also above was the gender diversity as female 
participation has paid a lot attention in recent decades. A diversified audit committee 
may succeed more efficient results than homogenous as they have different 
perspectives and different views within a conversation or to the solution of a problem. 
According to the corporate governance mentioned above on literature review we may 
suppose that female directors are likely to increase audit committee’s control activities 
and meliorate the quality of financial reports. Ittonen (2010), after examining Finnish 
and Swedish companies from NASDAQ, supports that female directors enhance the 
audit committee’s effectiveness because they are hard- working and competent. 
Additionally, there are researches which support that for female directors would be 
more difficult to manipulate financial statements and they can contribute to the 
improvement of firms’ reporting discipline and increase investor confidence in financial 
statements. (Heminway, 2009; Srinidhi, 2011; Clatworthy and Peel, 2013). Other 
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studies, like for instance Webb (2004) and Solberg (2006), have shown that women are 
prepared better for board meetings than men and thus female representation may 
improve corporate board behavior and its effectiveness and as for the second research 
it is supported that female directors are more sensitive to corporate social responsibility 
issues than men. Therefore, the last and the core hypothesis of the dissertation is 
formulated: 
 
H3: Audit committees with high female representation are more likely to report more 
negative discretionary accruals. 
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3. Empirical research 
This chapter deals with the empirical investigation of factors which affect earnings 
management and we will focus on female participation in audit committees. Variables 
used are first presented and then the description of statistical models is following. After 
that sampling procedure is described. This chapter ends with the analysis and 
discussion of relevant findings.  
 
3.1 Data and sample selection 
In order to compose the sample used, it was used companies included in STOXX 
Europe 600 in combination with Amadeus database for 2016. STOXX Europe 600 
Index is composed of large, mid and small capitalization companies across 17 
countries of the European region. These countries are: Austria, Belgium, Poland, 
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, 
Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. Then using 
Amadeus database it was selected only large companies with all available data needed 
for the equations of my hypothesis. I had to exclude companies which were not 
included in Amadeus database and those which did not include all the necessary 
information within their annual reports. As a result I had to exclude 150 companies,    
observations, and the final sample was   4,188 observations and 349 clusters of firms. 
The table below presents the description of the data sample for 17 European countries: 
 
Table I: Description of Data Sample: STOXX 600 Index 
Country Frequency Percentage 
United Kingdom 157 26.17 
France 88 14.67 
Germany 81 13.5 
Switzerland 50 8.33 
Sweden 44 7.33 
Italy 31 5.17 
Spain 26 4.33 
Netherlands 25 4.17 
Denmark 22 3.67 
Finland 17 2.83 
Belgium 15 2.5 
Norway 13 2.17 
Ireland 9 1.5 
Poland 8 1.33 
Austria 7 1.17 
Portugal 4 0.66 
Luxembourg 3 0.5 
Total 600 100 
 
In this table we observe how our sample is distributed among the 17 European 
countries and it deserve to mention the fact that over 50% of our data is accumulated in 
the United Kingdom (26.17%), France (14.67%) and Germany (13.5%).  
 
Most of the information was collected from Thomson Database combined with those 
provided by Amadeus Database. However, for 2016, there were not information about 
audit committees’ members’ gender, number and how many of them are independent. 
As a result in order to collect that information I downloaded and manually reviewed the 
proxy financial statements. Also some of the variables were calculated manually like 
the accrual variable which was the net income plus depreciation and amortization 
minus operating cash flows.  
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3.1.2 Methodology 
Our goal is the identification of the association exists between discretionary accruals 
and female representation on audit committees. Thus, we proceed by estimating how 
firms manage their earnings based on firm’s size, ROA, cash flows and some audit 
committees characteristics. 
 
According to the literature discretionary accruals are employed for investigating 
earnings management. As in similar studies (Klein,2002; Jones, 1991), a linear multiple 
regression analysis is used within this research in order to examine any relationship 
exists between earnings management which is the dependent variable through 
discretionary accruals and the female participation in audit committees which 
represents the  independent variable. As discretionary accruals is one of the most 
known and convenient way for managers to handle, we will concentrate on current 
discretionary accruals. Further, Jaggi et al (2009) when counting for discretionary 
accruals we should also take into consideration firm performance.  
 
Alebaugh, LaFond and Mayhew (2003) made a research in which they used 
discretionary accruals model in order to find the relationship of audit fees with the 
measures of biased financial reporting. For presicing the impact on firm performance 
two measurements of discretionary accruals were used. The first measure of 
discretionary accruals is Portfolio Performance Adjusted Discretionary Current Accruals 
(PADCA), which uses a portfolio technique to control firm performance. The second 
measure of discretionary accruals includes a control variable for firm performance in 
the regression model used to calculate discretionary accrual (REDCA).  
 
Taking all the above factors in to consideration, this study will base on Kothari et al. 
(2005) research which applied a cross sectional regression of the performance 
adjusted current discretionary accruals or PACDA. The performance- matched 
discretionary accruals will be used because Kothari shows that this approach is less 
misspecified than other measures like Jones (1991). 
As in ALM (2003) and Kothari (2005) PADCA is calculated as follows: 
 
TCAit/ATit-1= α0(1/ATit-1)+ β1(ΔREVit/ATit-1)+ β2(ROAit-1) + εit   (1) 
 
Where, 
TCA= total current accruals is net income, before extraordinary items and discontinued 
operations, plus depreciation and amortization minus operating cash flows for firm i in 
year t 
AT= Total assets for firm i in year t 
ΔREV= change in revenue for firm i in year t 
ROA= Return On Assets- ratio of net income before extraordinary items tot total assets 
for firm i in year t-1 
ε1= Error term for firm i in year t 
Then we use the parameters from equation 1 to calculate the expected current 
accruals: 
 
ECAit/ATit-1= α0(1/ΑΤit-1) + β1[(ΔREVit-ΔARit)/ATit-1] + β2(ROAit-1)  (2) 
 
Where, ΔAR is equal to change in accounts receivable for firm i in year t. Firm’s 
Performance Adjusted Current Discretionary Accruals (PACDA) is equal to: 
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PACDA= TCAit/ATit - ECAit/ATit-1   (3) 
 
After that, it follows, with the use of an OLS regression model, the test for the relation 
between gender variables and performance- adjusted discretionary accruals, PACDA. 
 
 
3.1.3 Dependent, Independent and Control Variables 
As mentioned from the above equations earnings management compiles the 
dependent variable which is calculated by the absolute value of discretionary accruals, 
divided by lagged total assets, where lagged assets are the assets in the beginning of 
the year.  
Within this research there are various control variables. The first independent variable 
(ACFMDIR) refers to the proportion of female directors on audit committee board to the 
total number of audit committee members on company’s board.  
 
In order to find the other independent variables I use different prior studies (e.g. 
Peasnell et al, 2005; Bushman et al, 2004; Bedard et al, 2004). We use BIG4 variable 
in order to control the effects of auditor’s quality on discretionary accruals. It is 
numbered with 1 if a firm is audited by Big 4 auditors otherwise with 0.Krishman (2003) 
and Ahsen (2011) present similar results in their studies and they conclude that clients 
with non-BIG 4 auditors have higher levels of discretionary accruals while Big 4 
auditors associate with less earnings management with firms.  
 
As for the audit committee size there are different views which have also been 
presented in the literature review. On the on hand, Jensen (1993) supports that large 
boards may be ineffective because of higher communication costs and he suggests 
that a large audit committee may face the same problems. On the other hand, Bedard 
et al. (2004) supports that if a large audit committee exists, it is more possible to 
disclose and resolve potential misstatements during the preparation of financial reports, 
as they could provide the necessary strength, variety of options and expertise needed 
to ensure effective monitoring. There also another view from Klein (2002) who argues 
that “one size can’t fit all”. 
 
Each firm and each audit committee should evolve and develop its own guidelines 
suited to its corporation. Similar arguments are presented as for the firm size variable 
(FSIZE). Gu et al. (2005) supports that there is a negative association between firm’s 
size and discretionary accruals while Aini et al. (2006) argues that the choice of income 
decreasing accounting accruals from large firms perhaps due to the avoidance of 
political costs. 
 
CFLO refers to the cash flow from operations, which is measured by the cash flow from 
operations scaled by company’s total assets. Soliman and Ragab (2014) demonstrated 
a significant and negative relation between cash flow from operations and earnings 
management indicator. This is supported by older studies. Jiang et al. (2008) that firms 
with a strong operating cash flow performance do not need to manage discretionary 
accruals as they already perform well. In the same vein, is the study of Dechow (1995) 
as he argues that lower operating cash flows are related with higher discretionary 
accruals.  
 
According to Norhayati Zamri et al (2013) leverage is one of the controlling and 
monitoring system which limits earnings management. Financial leverage is measured 
by debt-to-assets ratio, and in the research of Soliman and Ragab (2014) they found 
that there is a negative and significant relationship with earnings management. This is 
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also supported by Bradbury 1990 the greater the firm’s leverage, the higher the firm’s 
level of risk assumed, and as a result, firms may receive qualified opinions.  
 
The ACC variable represents the current accruals, which are measured by the ratio of 
total current accruals (net income plus depreciation and amortization minus operating 
cash flow) to total assets. This variable was used by Sun et al. (2010), Chung and 
Kallapur (2003) and from Thiruvadi et al. (2011) to control the reversal effect of prior 
accruals. 
 
According to Klein (2002) except from firm size negative earnings may also influence 
audit committee quality. This dummy variable is 1 if the firm has a loss for both year t-1 
and t, otherwise it is 0. According to Martinez et al. (2016) there is a positive 
association between losses and the receipt of qualified audit reports. Losses are 
expected to enhance earnings management since firms facing financial difficulties have 
adequate incentives to engage with financial statements manipulation.  
 
ROA is an indicator of profitability and is the ratio of net income divided by total assets. 
Profitability according to literature may be affected by managers in case of the threat of 
losing their bonus and as a result it expected to be negatively associated with earnings 
management. Also companies which performed poorly may lead to manipulation of 
their reported accounts. (Rahman and Ali, 2006).  
 
The last dependent variable is the audit committee independence (ACIND). Bedard et 
al (2004) find that the participation of independent members within audit committees 
may has an impact on financial information’s quality. More specifically, aggressive 
earnings management is negatively associated with audit committee independence. 
According to Martinez et al. (2016) and other previous studies the presence of 
independent directors on audit committees better protects the credibility of financial 
statements. That happens because independent directors are outsiders and 
independent from managers. Thus, managers will accept more easily the adjustments 
proposed by auditors in order to correct financial statements (Song and Windra, 2004). 
 
Finally, we use a geographical segment diversification in order to find the relation 
between female representation in audit committees and their impact on earnings 
management. Thus, we incorporate one dummy variable, Country, to separate the 17 
countries used and Sector to separate firms according to the sector they belong to.  
 
In the following table are presented the dependent and independent variables, their 
indicators, their expected signs according to prior literature and in the last column is 
their measurement. 
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Table II: Description and predicted signs of variables 
Variables Indicator 
Expected 
Signs 
Measurement 
Dependent Variable 
Discretionary Accruals DAC 
 Measured by PADCA 
Independent Variables 
Audit Committee Size ACSIZE +/- 
It is the total number of audit 
committee members 
Audit Committee 
Independence 
ACIND +/- 
%- Number of female independent 
members on ACs/Total number of 
directors on ACs 
Audit Committee 
Female Directors 
ACFMDIR +/- 
%- Number of women on  
ACs/Total number of directors on 
ACs 
BIG4 audit office BIG4 - 
Indicator variable- 1 if the sample 
firm is audited by BIG4 firms, and 0 
otherwise 
Firm’s Size FSIZE - 
Natural log of total assets 
Leverage LEVER + 
Debt-to-assets Ratio 
Cash Flows from 
Operating Activities 
CFLO - 
Cash Flow from Operations scaled 
by total assets at the beginning of 
the period 
ROA ROA - 
Net income-to-total assets Ratio 
Negative Earnings LOSS + 
Indicator variable- 1 if the firm 
sample had a loss in 2015 or 2016, 
otherwise 0 
Current Accruals ACC + 
last year’s total current accruals 
(net income before extraordinary 
items plus depreciation and 
amortization minus operating cash 
flows) divided by beginning of year 
total assets 
 
Based on the prior variables, the following logistic regression is performed: 
 
DCAC=β0+ β1ACSIZE+ β2ACIND+ β3ACFMDIR+ β4BIG4+ β5FSIZE+ β6CFLO+ 
β7LEVER+ β8ACC+ β9LOSS+ β10ROA+ β11Country*+ β12Sector* + ε (2) 
 
Where, 
DCAC= Discretionary accruals 
ACFMDIR= Audit Committee Female Directors 
BIG4= if the firm is audited by Big4 company 
ACSIZE= Audit Committee size 
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FSIZE= Firm’s size 
CFLO= Cash Flow from Operations 
LEVER= Leverage 
ACC= Current accruals  
LOSS= negative earnings 
ROA= Return on Assets 
ACIND= Audit Committee Independence 
Country= Country effects 
Sector= Sector effects 
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4. Empirical Results and Discussion 
In this chapter it will be provided descriptive statistics on the dependent variables and 
the explanatory ones. Furthermore, it will be informative about the correlations among 
variables used. Then, it will present the regression analysis as well as the research’s 
findings and three sensitivity tests.  
4.1 Descriptive Statistics and correlations 
In this section, it will be provided information for both dependent and independent 
variables used in this study. More specifically table presents descriptive statistics for 
the sample of our 349 firms.  
 
Table III: Descriptive Statistics for Dependent and Independent Variables 
Variable Mean Min 25th Median 75th Max StDev 
DCAC 1.75e-19 -0.254 -0.011 -0.003 0.008 0.277 0.032 
ACSIZE 3.229 2 3 4 5 12 1.313 
ACIND 0.787 0 0.667 1 1 1 0.262 
ACFMDIR 0.330 0 0.2 0.333 0.5 1 0.233 
BIG4 0.897 0 1 1 1 1 0.305 
FSIZE 15.974 11.898 14.990 15.840 16.999 19.831 1.401 
CFLO 0.384 -0.032 0.062 0.091 0.126 59.143 3.782 
LEVER 0.268 0 0.135 0.224 0.324 7.050 0.417 
ACC -0.017 -12.589 -0.040 -0.002 0.012 8.138 0.805 
LOSS 0.135 0 0 0 0 1 0.342 
ROA 0.060 -0.232 0.030 0.050 0.081 0.399 0.067 
 
From those results there are some that deserves to mention. As for the results relating 
to the dependent variable DCAC reveal a very low mean value of DCAC and that 
indicates that on average only a very small part of our sample is manipulating its 
earnings. The minimum value corresponds to -0.254 while the maximum is 0.277.   
 
Moreover, we found that the average size of the committee with at least one female 
director is 4.33 and as for those containing only men as directors is 3.85. For audit 
committees with female presence the smallest consist of 2 members while the largest 
is 12. As for audit committees with only male directors the minimum number of 
members is 3 and the maximum is 7. In total the mean value of ACSIZE is 3.229. 
Regarding the composition of audit committees it is also observed that the average 
ratio of independent directors is 0.787 or 78,7%.  
 
As shown form table, about 89,7 % of firms sampled have as auditors one of  the2 Big 
Four companies (Deloitte, PriceWaterhouseCoopers, Ernst& Young and KPMG). The 
median value of 1 show that all firms chosen close to central tendency observations, 
are audited by one the big 4 audit companies.  
 
Firm size variable is the logarithm of total assets and is used to keep the order of 
values intact, therefore the results may be obtained with a transformed variable 
interpretable. 
 
The next variable is cash flow which presents a standard deviation of 3.872. it is 
considered a relatively large standard deviation and that means that the values in our 
dataset are farther away from the mean. That’s true if we observe the rest of the results 
as the minimum is -0.032, the maximum 59.143 and the mean value 0.384. 
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Within the results if ACC variable we observe that the median value is negative as well 
as the mean value and that means that the majority of our sample presents negative 
accruals. The percentage of mean value in LOSS variable is relatively low (13.5%) 
which indicates that 13.5% of our sample has a loss in years 2016 and 2015.  
 
Lastly, it deserves to mention the results concerned ROA and Leverage values as they 
are connected. Firstly, the mean value of ROA is positive (0.06). This is an indicator 
that most of companies used are using efficiently their assets in order to generate 
income and that they may not use risky strategies. In the same vein, leverage has a 
mean value of 0.268, which may indicate that companies selected are able to repay 
their debts used to finance their assets and as a result the need for manipulating 
numbers to present better financial reports is decreasing. 
Correlation Matrix 
One frequent and important problem occurs concerning regression analysis is 
multicollinearity. Multicollinearity problem appears when the explanatory variables are 
too vastly correlated with each other. In order to measure the extent of this problem I 
will make a correlation matrix among the individual variables. According to Field (2011), 
values higher than 0.8 are problematic. Pearson and Spearman will be used as they 
measure the strength and the direction of association that exists among the variables. 
Pearson consists a conventionalized standard for measuring  the power of the 
association exists between two variables (Field,2011) while Spearman rank- order 
correlation coefficient is helpful for minimizing the effects of extreme scores. In the 
table below the upper and lower triangle represent Pearson and Spearman results 
respectively.  
 
Table IV: Pearson and Spearman Correlations 
AC ACSIZE ACIND ACFMDIR BIG4 FSIZE CFLO LEVER ACC LOSS ROA 
ACSIZE 1 -0.279*** -0.318*** 0.064 0.247*** -0.105* 0.053 0.051 0.048 -0.047 
ACIND -0.249*** 1 0.184*** 0.124** -0.063 0.075 0.123** 0.022 -0.037 -0.001 
ACFMDIR -0.246*** 0.162* 1 0.089 -0.090 0.127** -0.008 -0.224** -0.125** 0.058 
BIG4 0.135 0.018 0.187** 1 0.044 -0.053 0.059 -0.007 0.023 -0.039 
FSIZE 0.245*** -0.024 -0.108 0.020 1 -0.312*** 0.150*** -0.107 0.190*** 
-
0.364*** 
CFLO -0.131 0.224** 0.184** -0.021 0.420*** 1 -0.035 0.112 -0.184*** 
-
0.426*** 
LEVER 0.028 0.137 -0.002 0.002 0.126 -0.132 1 0.055 -0.002 
-
0.188*** 
ACC 0.087 0.001 -0.156* 0.058 -0.156*** -0.203** 0.043 1 0.027 0.185** 
LOSS 0.048 0.072 -0.109 -0.012 0.305*** -0.074 0.034 0.086 1 
-
0.235*** 
ROA -0.100 0.187** 0.132 -0.018 -0.568*** 0.696*** -0.205** 0.260*** -0.141 1 
***, ** and * indicate a significance at the level of 1, 5 and 10%, respectively (two-tailed tests) 
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According to Pearson correlation test the highest correlation exist between the 
variables ROA and CFLO (0.426). As for Spearman correlation test the highest 
correlation appears between the variables ROA and CFLO as previously (0.696). 
However, both of these values are below 0.8 and as a result there is no multicollinearity 
problem for the audit committee model. 
 
 
4.1.2 Regression Analysis 
The evidence presented above by descriptive statistics and regression assumptions in 
which included correlation matrix concerning univariate relations among the variables is 
not enough. Therefore I used also the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression to 
have more depth results.  
 
Firstly, I run the regression of DCAC only for the control variables and then I add 
gradually the variables we are interested to their effects on earnings management. 
Also, it worth mentioning that the table except from the coefficients and the t-statistic 
results also presents their significance level at 1, 5 and 10%. Moreover, within all the 
regressions are included sector and country effects.  
 
As concerning the first and the second model they present significant results. The first 
is composed only of controls variables while in the second we add the ACSIZE to find 
its relation with DCAC variable. From the results we observe that are two negative 
significant relationships at 10% between discretionary accruals and FSIZE (t- statistic=-
1.74) and LEVER (t-statistic= -1.93). This practically means that the larger the firm size 
and company’s leverage, the smaller the value of discretionary accruals.  
 
The third model presents more interesting results, as except from the negative 
significance of FSIZE and LEVER at 5% and 10% respectively, it is also noted a 
significant negative relation with CFLO( -2.63) at 1%. The most remarkable notice 
concerns the significance between ACIND and discretionary accruals at 5% with t-
statistic= -0.59.  
 
In the last column, we observe different significant relations when we tested the 
association between discretionary accruals after adding the ACFMDIR variable. 
Although we did not find any relationship between discretionary accruals and audit 
committee female representation the negative relation that appears between 
discretionary accruals and BIG 4 is the only one from this table that is presented at 
table VII, too.  
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Table V: Regression Results for Control, ACSIZE, ACIND, ACFMDIR variables 
DCAC Controls ACSIZE ACIND ACFMDIR 
BIG4 -0.229 -0.221 -0.182 -0.616* 
 (-0.77) (-0.73) (-0.62) (-1.86) 
FSIZE -0.143* -0.140* -0.170** -0.141 
 (-1.74) (-1.66) (-2.05) (-1.59) 
CFLO -0.214 -0.214 -0.590*** -0.160 
 (-1.56) (-0.56) (-2.63) (-1.18) 
LEVER -0.192* -0.192* -0.191* -0.241** 
 (-1.93) (-1.93) (-1.93) (-2.34) 
ACC 0.112 0.113 0.003 0.133* 
 (1.55) (1.55) (0.04) (1.70) 
LOSS -0.101 -0.109 0.129 -0.254 
 (-0.25) (-0.27) (0.32) (-0.53) 
ROA -0.235 -0.235 0.000 -0.413** 
 (-0.82) (-1.43) (0.00) (-2.40) 
ACSIZE  -0.078   
  (-0.20)   
ACIND   -0.139**  
   (-0.59)  
ACFMDIR    0.246 
    (0.88) 
Constant -3.276** -3.222**             -3.795*** -3.032** 
 (-2.56) (-2.46) (-2.94) (-2.21) 
Industry Effects Included Included Included Included 
Country Effects Included Included Included Included 
R2 0.1141 0.1144 0.1424 0.1680 
Adjusted R2 0.0572 0.0507 0.0802 0.0909 
F-value 2.00 1.80 2.29 2.18 
In parentheses are presented the t-statistic values 
***,**and * indicate a significance at the level of 1,5 and 10%, respectively (two-tailed tests) 
 
Table VII displays the most remarkable results from the analysis of all variables 
included in equation 2. We did not find any significant coefficient for ACFMDIR (t-
statistic= 1.37). As a result it is not shown any significance relationship between the 
presence of female directors on audit committees and earnings management quality. 
The ACSIZE variable is also insignificant with our dependent variable, thus the audit 
committee size may not has an impact on audit committee’s effectiveness in detecting 
earnings manipulation. As for the second hypothesis we had to examine the negative 
significant relationship exists between earnings management and audit committee 
independence at 10% (t- statistic= -1.68). BIG4 variable also presents a negative 
significance at 5% and that’s and indicator that firms with one of the BIG4 as an audit 
committee is less likely to present accrual- based earnings management.  
 
Generally, the majority variables which present the same signs as predicted from table 
II. The only exceptions are LOSS and LEVER which were expected to have positive 
instead of negative signs. As for the R- squared all the models have similar results 
while the higher value is presented at the ACFMDIR model with 16.80%. in the same 
model belongs the higher adjusted R-squared which indicates how useful are the 
variables included within the model.  
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Table VI: Regression Results 
Variables Coefficient t statistic 
ACSIZE 0.014 1.01 
ACIND -0.015* -1.68 
ACFMDIR 0.013 1.37 
BIG4 -0.027** -2.40 
FSIZE -0.005 -1.65 
CFLO -0.007 -0.85 
LEVER -0.003 -1.02 
ACC 0.003 0.80 
LOSS -0.001 -0.09 
ROA -0.005 -0.73 
Constant 0.07 -0.73 
Obs  1180 
Industry Effects Included Included 
Country Effects Included Included 
R2  0.1567 
Adjusted R2  0.0603 
F-value  1.63 
***,**and * indicate a significance at the level of1,5 and 10%, respectively (two-tailed tests) 
 
 
4.1.3 Sensitivity and Robustness Tests 
In order to investigate if our main results presented above are robust, we focus our 
study on the following sensitivity analyses. The first test is referred to the situation of 
self, selection bias which may lead to a biased sample of female directors within audit 
committees. The participation of women in audit committees may occurs from some 
firm characteristics which in their turn may affect accruals. 
 
Some of these characteristics according to Klein 2002 are audit committee size, 
negative earnings, firm size and the participation of independent directors. We run the 
following probit model for ensuing that the lack of significance evidence is not due to 
the self- selection bias: 
 
Pr(FMDIR)= α0+ α1ACSIZE+ α2LOSS+ α3FSIZE+ α4ACIND (3) 
  
Where, 
FMDIR= the presence of female directors, 1 if there is at least one woman in audit 
committee, 0 otherwise 
ACSIZE= Audit Committee size 
LOSS= negative earnings 
FSIZE= firm size 
ACIND= audit Committee Independence 
With the use of equation 3, I compute the Inverse Mills Score in Stata which was used 
from Hackman to correct for the selection bias. After that, I run again the regression of 
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DCAC and the results are presented in the following table (VIII). By adding the inverse 
Mills ratio within the OLS regression we test for any endogeneity in the selection of 
female directors. The equation used was: 
 
DCAC2=β0+ β1ACFMDIR+ β2BIG4+ β3ACSIZE+ β4FSIZE+ β5CFLO+ β6LEVER+ 
β7ACC+β8LOSS+ β9ROA+ β10ACIND+ β11IMS+ ε (4) 
 
Where IMS is the Inverse Mills Ratio based on results of equation 3.  
The results are presented in the first column in table VIII. Although, we did not succeed 
to find any significance between the presence of female directors in audit committees 
and discretionary accruals, we find other interesting results. Firstly, with the addition of 
self selection bias in our main regression it appears except from the significance of 
ACIND (t statistic= -2.41) and BIG4 (t statistic= -2.26) with discretionary accruals 
another negative association with FSIZE (t statistic= -2.54) at 5% while a positive 
relation exists with loss (t statistic= 1.70). Also, it deserves to mention the negative 
relation that comes from IMR1 (t statistic= -1.95) which indicates that this variable 
affects discretionary accruals.  
 
The second robust test concerns the country that owns most of the companies included 
in the sample. This country is United Kingdom with 105 companies. Unfortunately, after 
the regression of variables only for UK we find any significance relationship between 
discretionary accruals and variables. The R-squared is relative low but it appears to be 
higher from all the previous regressions. Our findings suggest that in United Kingdom 
none of the variables used may affect earnings management.  
 
The last sensitivity test is concentrated on countries which compile the majority of our 
sample, and more specifically these countries are United Kingdom (26.17%), France 
(14.67%) and Germany (13.5%). from the results we observe that there are some 
similarities with our first regression DCAC as well as with DCAC2. On the one hand, 
there is a positive significance with ACIND which confirm that lower shares of 
independent directors may have a positive impact in constraining earnings 
management. Also, there is another negative significant relationship between firm size 
and accruals (-1.88) which is in agreement with the research of Gu et al (2005). 
Alternatively, we still did not succeed to find any relation between earnings quality and 
the existence of female directors in audit committees as the results are insignificant (t-
statistic= 0.15).  
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Table VII: Results from Robustness Tests 
 DCAC2 UK 
UK,FRANCE, 
GERMANY 
ACSIZE -0.072 0.011 0.002 
 (1.56) (1.28) (0.51) 
ACIND -0.062** 0.023 0.045* 
 (-2.41) (0.44) (1.85) 
ACFMDIR 0.013 -0.004 0.004 
 (1.43) (-0.09) (0.15) 
BIG4 -0.025** 0.007 0.0088 
 (-2.26) (0.5) (0.56) 
FSIZE -0.014** -0.01 -0.008* 
 (-2.54) (-1.57) (-1.88) 
CFLO -0.007 -0.004 -0.006 
 (-0.90) (-0.21) (-0.52) 
LEVER -0.004 -0.004 -0.007 
 (-1.27) (-0.53) (-1.26) 
ACC 0.003 -0.01 -0.002 
 (1.00) (-1.03) (-0.4) 
LOSS 0.06* 0.011 -0.001 
 (1.70) (0.27) (-0.03) 
ROA -0.005 -0.001 -0.001 
 (-0.80) (-0.06) (-0.11) 
IMS -0.333*   
 (-1.95)   
Constant 0.389** 0.082 0.059 
 (2.32) (0.61) (0.83) 
Country Effects Included Included Included 
Sector Effects Included Included Included 
Obs 1180 400 720 
R2 0.1032 0.1872 0.14 
Adj R2 0.0174 -0.0931 0.0059 
In parentheses are presented the t- statistic values 
***, ** and * indicate a significance at the level of 1,5 and 10%, respectively 
Another important implication we may face is also whether the results are driven bythe 
fact that most of the audit committees contained within out sample present a relatively 
low proportion of female audit committee directors. In the first place, we examine audit 
committees with none female director in comparison with those with at least two female 
members. ACFMDIR is replaced by a dummy variable which is coded with “1” if there 
are at least two female directors, “0” otherwise. After that, we estimate again Eq. 2 and  
the results are appeared in Table VIII. In Columns 4 and 5 are presented the findings 
from the regression included dummy variable ACFMDIR, which is coded with “1” if at 
least 50% of audit committee members are female and “0” otherwise. From the 
reported results we observe that in both cases ACFMDIR dummy variable is 
insignificant although in the first case is positive (t statistic= 1.48) and in the second 
negative (t statistic=-0.47). Consequently, it is less likely that our results are due to the 
absence of female participation on audit committees. 
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Table VIII: Results on AC with at least 2 or 50% female directors 
Variables Two Female Directors  50% Female Directors 
 Coefficient t statistic  Coefficient t statistic 
ACSIZE 0.057 1.59  0.030 0.85 
ACIND -0.012 -0.84  0.022 0.93 
ACFMDIR 0.049 1.48  -0.023 -0.47 
BIG4  -0.069 -2.47**  0.019 0.42 
FSIZE -0.005 -0.74  -0.013 -2.02* 
CFLO 0.001 0.04  -0.017 -0.77 
LEVER -0.009 -1.54  -0.018 -2.28** 
ACC 0.004 0.71  0.007 1.30 
LOSS -0.023 -0.67  -0.002 -0.06 
ROA -0.009 -0.48  -0.009 -0.36 
Constant 0.047 0.57  0.095 1.04 
Country 
Effects 
 Included   Included 
Sector 
Effects 
 Included   Included 
Obs  630   430 
R2  0.2677   0.3426 
Adj R2  0.0919   0.0796 
In parentheses are presented the t- statistic values 
***, ** and * indicate a significance at the level of 1,5 and 10%, respectively 
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5. Conclusion and Discussion 
In recent years because of the high- profile earnings management cases around the 
world, the role of the audit committee on earnings management has come under 
considerable scrutiny. More specifically, gender diversity on audit committees gain 
more attention as they considered more conservative and they could prevent the 
company from unethical behaviors in financial reporting. Previous research has 
emphasized on various audits committee’s characteristics to find the outcomes related 
to earnings manipulation. However, the majority of previous studies were concentrated 
on US companies and to other characteristics, like the independence, meetings, size 
and financial expertise rather than gender diversity.  
 
In this thesis, our main target is to explore the effects from the participation of female 
directors within audit committees on discretionary accruals, which is useful for the 
measurement of earnings quality. Using a sample of 349 European companies from 
STOXX 600 Index for the year ended 2016; we did not manage to find any significant 
relationship between earnings management and gender diversity. Although the results 
are not in accordance with most of the existing literature, Sun (2011) who also did not 
find any relationship, reports that there are several possible causes, which cannot be 
controlled, that drive the research to null results. For instance, female directors 
although they are considered more ethical they may cannot affect committee’s balance 
and it’s also difficult to test all the audit committee members as for their real ethical 
attitudes towards earnings manipulation.  
 
On the other hand, the hypothesis about audit committee independence and earnings 
management is in accord with prior investigations (Klein, 2002; DeFond et Francis, 
2006) as we observe from our results that there is a negative association between the 
presence of independent female directors in audit committees and earnings 
management. As for the hypothesis about the influence of audit committee size we find 
no effects in constraining earnings management. Although there were different options 
as for the audit committee’s size, from this research we confirm the suggestion of Klein 
2002 who argues that “one size can’t fit all”.  
 
This thesis is subjected to various limitations, which should be taken into consideration. 
Firstly, all the countries included in Europe and more specifically in STOXX 600 Index 
are not operating in the same way and within the same environment. Some of them 
have increased voluntary the presence of women in audit committees because they 
have observed their positive impacts and other have to increase them after the 
mandatory quotas imposing in their countries. This compiles also the second limitation 
of this research as the quotas have not yet completed and the results may be different 
for example the next year.  Furthermore, the data sample is relatively small. During 
adding manually all the required variables and especially the gender ones a significant 
percentage of observations were removed. For calculating earnings quality, it was used 
the proxy of accruals which it could be very noisy although this is the most reliable and 
common used method. Moreover, there is the skewness limitation. More specifically, 
despite the application of log transformation to all the variables and their relative 
improved results, the skewness may have an impact on results. Lastly, as gender 
equality legislation has not yet been applied to each European country this study may 
suffer from endogeneity problem (Gavious et al. 2012). 
 
Proposals for further research are mainly based on limitations mentioned above. 
Firstly, as the sample size is composed of companies included in STOXX 600 Index, it 
may not represents the majority of European firms; consequently, more companies in 
Europe can be studied. In order to face endogeneity problems it would be more 
appropriate to test each country separately or only those which have already applied 
 [- 29 -] 
 
the legislation about audit committees as concerning mandatory female representation. 
Also, female presence on audit committees and its impact could be investigating for 
several years. The last suggestion which can be interesting for further research is the 
cultural gender differences and the effect of the audit committee on earnings 
management. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 [- 30 -] 
 
Bibliography 
 
Abdul Rahman, R., & Haneem Mohamed Ali, F. (2006). Board, audit committee, culture 
and earnings management: Malaysian evidence. Managerial Auditing Journal, 21(7), 
783-804. 
 
Adams, R. B., & Funk, P. (2012). Beyond the glass ceiling: Does gender 
matter?. Management science, 58(2), 219-235. 
 
Aini, A., Takiah, M.I., Pourjalali, H. and Teruya, J. (2006). Earnings Management in 
Malaysia: A Study on Effects of Accounting Choices. Malaysian Accounting Review, 
5(1), 185-207. 
 
Al-Baidhani, D. (2014). The Role of Audit Committee in Corporate Governance: 
Descriptive Study. 
 
Arun, T. G., Almahrog, Y. E., & Aribi, Z. A. (2015). Female directors and earnings 
management: Evidence from UK companies. International Review of Financial 
Analysis, 39, 137-146. 
 
Ashbaugh, H., LaFond, R., & Mayhew, B. W. (2003). Do nonaudit services compromise 
auditor independence? Further evidence. The accounting review, 78(3), 611-639. 
 
Balsam, S., Krishnan, J., & Yang, J. S. (2003). Auditor industry specialization and 
earnings quality. Auditing: A journal of practice & Theory, 22(2), 71-97. 
 
Bédard, J., & Gendron, Y. (2010). Strengthening the financial reporting system: Can 
audit committees deliver?. International journal of auditing, 14(2), 174-210. 
 
Bernard, V. L., & Skinner, D. J. (1996). What motivates managers' choice of 
discretionary accruals?. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 22(1-3), 313-325. 
 
Bradbury, M. E. (1990). The incentives for voluntary audit committee formation. Journal 
of Accounting and public policy, 9(1), 19-36. 
 
Bruns, W. J., & Merchant, K. (1990). The dangerous morality of managing 
earnings. Management Accounting, 72(2), 22-25. 
 
Cohen, D. A., & Zarowin, P. (2010). Accrual-based and real earnings management 
activities around seasoned equity offerings. Journal of accounting and 
Economics, 50(1), 2-19. 
 
De Franco, G., Kothari, S. P., & Verdi, R. S. (2011). The benefits of financial statement 
comparability. Journal of Accounting Research, 49(4), 895-931. 
 
Dechow, P. M., Sloan, R. G., & Sweeney, A. P. (1996). Causes and consequences of 
earnings manipulation: An analysis of firms subject to enforcement actions by the 
SEC. Contemporary accounting research, 13(1), 1-36. 
 
Dechow, P. M., & Skinner, D. J. (2000). Earnings management: Reconciling the views 
of accounting academics, practitioners, and regulators. Accounting horizons, 14(2), 
235-250. 
 
 [- 31 -] 
 
DeFond, M. L., & Francis, J. R. (2005). Audit research after sarbanes-oxley. Auditing: A 
Journal of Practice & Theory, 24(s-1), 5-30. 
 
European Commission (April 2016). Gender balance on corporate boards. Available: 
http://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/document.cfm?doc_id=46280. 
 
Fischer, P. E., & Louis, H. (2008). Financial reporting and conflicting managerial 
incentives: The case of management buyouts. Management Science, 54(10), 1700-
1714. 
 
Fondas, N., & Sassalos, S. (2000). A different voice in the boardroom: How the 
presence of women directors affects board influence over management. Global 
focus, 12(2), 13-22. 
 
Gender diversity on European boards (2016). Available: 
http://www.womenonboard.be/sites/default/files/EWoB-qualitative-WEB-3%5B4%5D-
July%202016.pdf 
 
Ghosh, A., Gu, Z., & Jain, P. C. (2005). Sustained earnings and revenue growth, 
earnings quality, and earnings response coefficients. Review of accounting 
studies, 10(1), 33-57. 
 
Glinkowska, B., & Kaczmarek, B. (2015). Classical and modern concepts of corporate 
governance (Stewardship Theory and Agency Theory). Management, 19(2), 84-92. 
 
Graham, J. R., Harvey, C. R., & Rajgopal, S. (2005). The economic implications of 
corporate financial reporting. Journal of accounting and economics, 40(1-3), 3-73. 
 
Gunny, K. A. (2010). The relation between earnings management using real activities 
manipulation and future performance: Evidence from meeting earnings 
benchmarks. Contemporary Accounting Research, 27(3), 855-888. 
 
Hamid, F., Hashim, H. A., & Salleh, Z. (2012). Motivation for earnings management 
among auditors in Malaysia. Procedia-Social and Behavioral Sciences, 65, 239-246. 
 
Healy, P. M., & Wahlen, J. M. (1999). A review of the earnings management literature 
and its implications for standard setting. Accounting horizons, 13(4), 365-383. 
 
Jiang, W., Lee, P., & Anandarajan, A. (2008). The association between corporate 
governance and earnings quality: Further evidence using the GOV-Score. Advances in 
Accounting, 24(2), 191-201. 
 
Jones, J. J. (1991). Earnings management during import relief investigations. Journal 
of accounting research, 193-228. 
 
Klein, A. (2006). Audit committee, board of director characteristics, and earnings 
management. 
 
Kothari, S. P., Leone, A. J., & Wasley, C. E. (2005). Performance matched 
discretionary accrual measures. Journal of accounting and economics, 39(1), 163-197. 
 
Lee, H., Xie, Y. A., & Zhou, J. (2011). Role of underwriters in restraining earnings 
management in initial public offerings. 
 
 [- 32 -] 
 
Leszczyńska, M. (2018). Mandatory Quotas for Women on Boards of Directors in the 
European Union: Harmful to or Good for Company Performance?. European Business 
Organization Law Review, 19(1), 35-61. 
 
Mulder, M. (2017). Earnings Management and Gender Diversity in the Board of 
Directors and Audit Committee. 
 
Papanastasopoulos, G. A., & Tsiritakis, E. (2015). The accrual anomaly in Europe: The 
role of accounting distortions. International Review of Financial Analysis, 41, 176-185. 
 
Peasnell, K. V., Pope, P. F., & Young, S. (2005). Board monitoring and earnings 
management: Do outside directors influence abnormal accruals?. Journal of Business 
Finance & Accounting, 32(7‐8), 1311-1346. 
 
Pucheta‐Martínez, M. C., Bel‐Oms, I., & Olcina‐Sempere, G. (2016). Corporate 
governance, female directors and quality of financial information. Business Ethics: A 
European Review, 25(4), 363-385. 
 
Report on equality between women and men in the EU (2018). April: 
https://publications.europa.eu/s/j2Jq. 
 
Roychowdhury, S. (2006). Earnings management through real activities 
manipulation. Journal of accounting and economics, 42(3), 335-370. 
 
Ruegger, D., & King, E. W. (1992). A study of the effect of age and gender upon 
student business ethics. Journal of Business Ethics, 11(3), 179-186. 
 
Srinidhi, B., Gul, F. A., & Tsui, J. (2011). Female directors and earnings 
quality. Contemporary Accounting Research, 28(5), 1610-1644. 
 
Stewart, J., & Munro, L. (2007). The impact of audit committee existence and audit 
committee meeting frequency on the external audit: Perceptions of Australian 
auditors. International Journal of Auditing, 11(1), 51-69. 
 
Sun, J., Liu, G., & Lan, G. (2011). Does female directorship on independent audit 
committees constrain earnings management?. Journal of Business Ethics, 99(3), 369-
382. 
 
Swai, J. P., & Mbogela, C. S. (2016). Accrual-based versus real earnings management: 
The effect of ownership structure: evidence from East Africa. ACRN Oxford Journal of 
Finance and Risk Perspectives, 5 (2), 121, 140. 
 
The impact of the audit reform on audit committees in Europe (2016). Available: 
https://www.accountancyeurope.eu/publications/the-impact-of-the-audit-reform-on-
audit-committees-in-europe/. 
 
Thiruvadi, S., & Huang, H. W. (2011). Audit committee gender differences and earnings 
management. Gender in Management: An International Journal, 26(7), 483-498. 
 
Zamri, N., Rahman, R. A., & Isa, N. S. M. (2013). The impact of leverage on real 
earnings management. Procedia Economics and Finance, 7, 86-95. 
 
Zang, A. Y. (2011). Evidence on the trade-off between real activities manipulation and 
accrual-based earnings management. The Accounting Review, 87(2), 675-703. 
 
 [- 33 -] 
 
Appendix 
Member State 
Share of women  
on boards(*), 
EU-28 average: 
23.3 % 
Quotas in place National measures in place 
Austria 20.1% 
Yes: only state-owned 
companies (35 % for 
supervisory boards by 2018). 
Self-regulation: The Corporate Governance 
Code of 2009 recommends representation of 
both genders in appointments to supervisory 
boards. 
Belgium 26.6% 
Yes: 33% for executives and 
non- executives in state-
owned and listed companies-
by 2017 and in listed SMEs-by 
2019. 
Self-regulation: The Corporate Governance 
Code of 2009 recommends that the composition 
of a board is determined on the basis of gender 
diversity. 
Bulgaria 17.9% No No 
Croatia 22.2% No No 
Cyprus 10.9% No No 
Czech Republic 8.8% No No 
Denmark 27.0% No 
Boards in state-owned companies should ‘as far 
as possible’ have an equal gender balance; a 
man and a woman nominated for every vacancy 
(executives and non-executives). From 2013 - 
obligation to all companies (listed and non-listed) 
to self-regulate and set their own targets. A 
company can be fined if it hasn’t set any target 
figures or hasn’t submitted any reporting. 
Estonia 8.2% No No 
Finland 29.9% No 
State-owned companies are required to have an 
‘equitable proportion of women and men’. The 
Corporate Governance Code for listed 
companies contains recommendation that 
‘boards shall consist of both sexes’. 
France 37.1% 
Yes: from 2011 - 40 % by 
2017. Applicable to non-
executive directors in large 
listed and non- listed 
companies. 
The AFEP-MEDEF Corporate Code: 
recommendation containing same quotas as in 
the Law of 2011, applicable to all board 
members. 
Germany 27.2% 
Yes: from 2016 - 30 % for 
supervisory boards of the 
listed companies that are 
submitted to parity co-
determination (the roughly 110 
biggest listed companies). 
Other companies that are either listed or fall 
under parity co-determination have to set 
individual quantitative objectives of women on 
boards with regard to non-executive and 
executive board members and senior managers 
below board level and deadlines to achieve 
them. 
Greece 9.4% 
Yes, 33 % - only companies 
fully or partially owned by the 
State. Applicable to all board 
positions (executives and non-
executives). 
Soft positive action measures in public sector. 
 
Hungary 11.2% No Soft positive action measures in public sector. 
Ireland 16.0% No 
A policy target of 40 % female participation on all 
state boards and committees. Soft positive 
action measures in public sector employment. 
Italy 30.0% 
Yes: 33 % by 2015 for listed 
companies and state-owned 
companies. Applicable to 
management boards and 
supervisory boards (i.e. 
executives and non-
executives). 
Yes 
Latvia 27.7% No Soft positive action measures in the public 
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sector. 
Lithuania 13.0% No No 
Luxembourg 12.9% No 
Soft positive action measures. The Corporate 
Code of 2009 recommends the board to have an 
appropriate representation of both genders. The 
rule is applicable to all board members. 
Malta 5.0% No No 
Netherlands 28.1% 
Target of 30 % in the 
executive boards and 
supervisory boards  
of large companies - “comply 
or explain” mechanism, no 
sanctions. Measure to expire 
in 2016. 
Self-regulation: diversity clauses in the Dutch 
Corporate Governance Code of 2009, applicable 
to both executives and non-executives. 
Voluntary Charter with targets for more women 
in management. 
 
Poland 19.9% No 
The executive ordinance of Minister of State 
Treasury obliges state-owned companies to 
‘choose adequately prepared members of 
supervisory boards, taking into account the 
balanced participation of women and men’. The 
Code of good practices attached to that 
ordinance establishes a target of 30% for 2015 
and a priority rule for equally qualified women. 
No sanctions are envisaged. 
Portugal 14.2% No 
A government resolution of 2015 encourages 
listed companies to attain 30 % of the under-
represented sex at their administrative bodies by 
2018. 
Romania 10.1% No 
Soft positive action measures in public sector 
employment. 
Slovakia 14.3% No No 
Slovenia 23.9% No 
Regulation on state-owned companies: A 
principle  
of 40% representation of each sex applies to  
the nomination or appointment of government 
representatives to management and supervisory 
boards of state-owned enterprises (executives 
and non-executives). No sanctions apply if the 
principle is not respected. 
Spain 20.2% 
Yes: 40 % (both executives  
and non-executives) by 2015 
(but no sanctions, thus rather 
a recommendation by nature) 
in state-owned companies 
with 250 or more employees. 
New possible models under 
discussion 
Soft positive action measures in public sector 
employment. 
 
Sweden 36.1% No 
Self-regulation: The Corporate Governance 
Code of 2004 has a voluntary goal of parity for 
listed companies – “comply or explain” 
mechanism. 
United 
Kingdom 
27.1% No 
Self-regulation – from 2012 on the basis of 
principles of UK Corporate Governance Code 
(following the Lord Davies’ recommendation). 
The recommended target for listed companies in 
FTSE 100: 25%, by 2015 is applicable to all 
board members. FTSE 350 companies 
recommended setting their own aspirational 
targets to be achieved by 2013 and 2015. 
Performances above the EU average are in bold2 
 
                                               
2 Data: April, 2016. Source: http://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/document.cfm?doc_id=46280 
